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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the possibilities offered by 
informal communities of practice to operate as 
“prototyping spaces” for innovation in the context of 
developing economies. It begins by looking at the 
concept of “economic complexity” and how it is 
useful in both guiding the priorities and evaluating 
the challenges developing economies face when 
attempting to drive growth and build measures of 
resilience, and raises the question of how these 
economies can both introduce higher complexity 
activities while compensating for latecomer 
disadvantages versus more complex economies. It 
then examines in detail the case of the Twin Eagles 
Group, a Peruvian video game development 
community in the 1990s, and how they reverse 
engineered technologies and global practices to 
pursue their creative objectives. Based on this case, it 
concludes by laying out some of the methodological 
challenges associated to researching this sort of 
community because of the multi-sited nature of their 
activities. 
INTRODUCTION 
Transforming developing economies into future-
proof operations has proven to be a consistent 
challenge for decades. Going from a productive 
matrix built chiefly on primary activities including 
agriculture and resource extraction, to a higher value-
added matrix of productive activities, is a resource-
intensive process taking very long periods of time. It 
is not uncommon that precarious institutional 
environments and changing political and economic 
landscapes can derail large-scale commitments to 
introduce and grow new economic sectors that 
generate higher investment returns and reduced 
negative externalities. 
 
These large-scale commitments usually require multi-
level interventions designed to bridge the gap 
separating developing economies from their 
industrial and post-industrial competitors, and 
therefore not to compensate for several years or 
decades of latecomer disadvantage to achieve 
significant “competitive advantage”. These efforts 
can involve some combination of government 
intervention, private sector development, technology 
investment, and education reform – any of which is a 
slow moving, complex system. At the same time, 
these commitments are both urgent and important: 
latecomer disadvantages only grow larger over time, 
and the need for accelerated industrialization pushes 
developing economies into a “race to the bottom” to 
cheapen their labor and relax their policing of 
regulation to encourage foreign investment. 
 
The present paper is an initial attempt at exploring 
alternatives to this form of engagement – both to the 
absolute need for large-scale commitments, and to 
the costly compromises of “race to the bottom” 
scenarios. It builds on the assumption that a 
significant amount of creative and productive activity 
is going unnoticed by most indicators – even in these 
developing economies – because it flies outside the 
radar of economic production. Informal communities 
of practice are operating as innovation networks with 
growing creative output, but for various reasons are 
failing to articulate into economically viable sectors, 
or are failing to register within the attention of 
policymakers, researchers and investors. 
 
These networks are out there and have been out there 
for a while, driven by self-motivated individuals with 
shared interests and passions and articulated through 
various forms of communications technologies 
making it possible, viable and sustainable for them to 
operate. Even in the absence of institutional climates 
favoring their emergence, or of access to resources 
facilitating their growth, these networks find the 
motivation to reverse engineer various layers of 
practices, institutions and technologies in order to 
accomplish their goals. In doing so, they’re 
introducing skills and knowledge into their local 
contexts in ways that would otherwise be incredibly 
costly, and they’re connecting with transnational 
communities of practice in attempting to do problem-
solving and creative exploration. 
 
In what follows, I will first go over the concept of 
economic complexity as the frame within which to 
understand the role these networks are playing. The 
work of Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hidalgo in this 
regard makes a solid case as to why developing 
economies need to focus increased efforts in 
diversifying their productive outputs as both a driver 
for accelerated growth and a measure to build 
resilience into otherwise fragile economies. But their 
work also points to how skill acquisition is one of the 
most complicated aspects of such diversification 
because of the large costs associated to it. I will argue 
that uncovering the communities and networks 
informally addressing these problems requires 
zooming in to the level of micro practices and social 
interactions that remain invisible to presently 
available metrics. Following that, I will briefly go 
over an example of one such network, operating 
almost invisibly, that was able to navigate these 
global and local processes with both successes and 
failures, and acquire and disseminate new skills in 
their local community: the Twin Eagles Group, a 
video game hacking and developing group operating 
in Lima, Peru, between 1989 and 2002, whose history 
is illustrative of the possibilities and challenges posed 
by the emergence of these networks in developing 
economies. Thirdly, I will highlight some of the 
methodological challenges facing the study of these 
networks because of their multi-sited character, and 
point to some of the questions researchers interested 
in these might want to consider when approaching 
them. I will finalize by providing some conclusions 
on the potential for the study of these networks and 
some questions for future exploration. 
THE PERKS OF BEING COMPLEX 
To understand the potential value these networks can 
contribute to an economy, it is first important to 
understand the larger networks to which they are 
connected – the networks of economic activity and 
productive output covering cities, countries and 
regions. Depending on the granularity or the “zoom 
level” at which one may choose to examine them, 
these networks will exhibit different characteristics 
and possibilities, and different configurations. And 
these configurations can be evaluated internally 
based on their diversity: how many different outputs 
an economy has. In Hausmann and Hidalgo’s 
analysis, this becomes a measure of an economy’s 
complexity (Hausmann and Hidalgo 2011). 
 
Their comparative analysis of worldwide measures of 
complexity is based on trade data from recorded 
country exports. Based on this data, they can 
reconstruct a “product space” composed of all the 
possible products exported by some country in the 
world, and measure how various countries have a 
stake on some portion of that product space. If a 
country exports a product, then it follows that it 
produces such product. And if it produces such 
product, then it follows that its economy contains 
within it the necessary skills, knowledge and 
processes to make that production happen. Products 
can then be interpreted from the point of view of such 
skills, rather than in terms of the raw inputs required 
for production (as the raw inputs themselves can be 
interpreted in terms of the skills required to extract or 
produce them). 
 
As a consequence of their analysis of this data, they 
encountered that even though all countries produce 
some products, most countries export products that 
are also exported by a large number of other 
countries. Countries exporting products exported by 
few other countries have higher indicators of 
prosperity, which follows from two different factors. 
First, products with fewer exporters imply more 
complex processes of production requiring more 
skills, and therefore represent a higher value in the 
market (because their complexity makes them both 
scarcer and more expensive). Second, a larger 
diversity of products within a national economy 
(measured by a larger diversity in product exports) 
translates to a wider variety of productive skills. Even 
though cars and airplanes are different products, they 
share some subset of overlapping skills in their 
production. A country producing cars will be closer 
to producing airplanes than one that doesn’t. This 
means that as time goes on, countries with more 
skills are able to incorporate new productive 
activities faster than countries with fewer skills; and 
as economic landscapes shift, countries with more 
skills have a better chance at repurposing segments of 
their productive capacity in the face of changing 
demand than countries with fewer skills.  
 
Though I find this analysis very compelling, there are 
a couple shortcomings to it worth pointing out, which 
are directly related to the limitations of the data itself. 
On the one hand, relying on international trade data 
presents a compelling picture of how products are 
circulated, but it fails to account for the ways in 
which services are provided across country lines, as 
service provision does not go through customs 
processing. Not only do services represent a 
significant contribution to an economy, but they too 
can also be understood in terms of the skills required 
to provide them. On the other hand, the nature of the 
data places the analysis at the national economy 
level, where multiple levels of granularity are 
otherwise possible: similar network configurations 
can be found at the city level, and even within at the 
neighborhood level, or in the other direction at the 
regional level. It becomes, however, much more 
complicated to perform such an analysis at these 
levels, as there is no consistent measurement of 
inputs and outputs. However, these shortcomings do 
not diminish at all the value of this type of analysis or 
of the concept of economic complexity for operating 
as a guideline in understanding growth and 
innovation within economies at any scale (whether 
we have available data or not). Countries are 
networked between each other, we can extrapolate, 
very much in similar fashion as cities and regions are, 
or conceptually, as sectors and industries are. 
 
When thinking about economic complexity from the 
point of view of developing economies, we can begin 
to appreciate how developing economies struggle 
with their relatively low complexity. Not only do 
they tend to have less diverse exports, and therefore a 
presence in a smaller share of the product space, but 
those exports are also produced by a number of other 
countries, increasing competition between all 
exporters of a given product. Developing economies 
face the challenge of becoming more complex – that 
is, of producing a wider range of things other people 
want, and ideally have them be complex things that 
not many others produce.  
 
This in turn raises two questions. First, how do 
countries (or economies of any scale) expand their 
command of the product space, that is, how do they 
begin to produce new things? Since products can be 
understood in terms of the skills required to produce 
them, this becomes a questions regarding skill 
acquisition and how new skills are introduced into an 
economy. But as Hausmann and Hidalgo point out, 
skill acquisition for non-complex economies becomes 
a huge issue because of enormous costs associated to 
it. Matters of infrastructure, education, policy, and so 
on all come into play when determining whether new 
skills can be successfully introduced in a sustainable 
way, and the presence of prior complex skills 
becomes an indicator of the ease of introducing new 
complex skills. 
 
Second, how can economies that are able to 
successfully introduce new skills catch up to 
economies that were able to do so much earlier? 
Developing economies not only need to expand the 
diversity of their productive activities, but they need 
to do so fast and effectively enough that they will 
compensate for latecomer disadvantages. In practice, 
this means there is a requirement to innovate and 
diversify at a faster pace than complex economies 
have done so and continue to do so, but without the 
previous experiences and baseline layers of 
infrastructure complex economies have accrued in 
the process. 
 
In the next section, I want to explore one possible 
answer to the problem of having to generate 
affordable and sustainable environments of 
innovation that can potentially turn into viable 
economic sectors. Because of the way in which 
economic output is measured within economies and 
firms – that is, in terms of direct productivity and 
economic output – there ends up being a remainder of 
activities that are not counted towards those outputs 
but account for a significant contribution towards 
making those outputs possible. According to 
Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2010), in the case of 
firms, significant pockets of innovation go unnoticed 
simply because available metrics fail to account for 
activities that do not directly contribute to expected 
outputs. Firms are, therefore, missing out on a lot of 
potential value already being generated within their 
bounds.  
 
I believe a similar case can be made when looking 
outside of firms, at local or national economies: there 
are pockets of innovation and creativity out there that 
are going unnoticed because their activities fall 
outside the scope of available metrics and data – 
particularly because, in many cases, their activities 
are not considered to be economically productive at 
all. But these informal communities are generating 
the spaces and networks capable of introducing new 
skills into an economy even absent the prospects of 
immediate economic rewards. They are effectively 
creating prototyping spaces at a low cost, which may 
or may not be able to later become productive sectors 
and industries. These networks have been out there 
for a while, and they pose a challenge to us as 
researchers in terms of how to uncover and map 
them. 
A CASE OF REVERSE ENGINEERING 
To explore this possibility, I want to go back in time 
several years and take a detailed look at a historical 
case that I think illustrates many of the challenges 
and opportunities of this approach. In between the 
late 1980s and the early 2000s, a group called the 
Twin Eagles Group (TEG) was very active in the 
Peruvian video game hacking, modding and 
development scene, claiming for themselves such 
landmarks as having the first Peruvian-made video 
game to be distributed internationally in the European 
market (GunBee F-99, 1999), and having the first 
Peruvian-made video game to be independently 
released in the local market (The King of Peru 2, 
2002). Their history is a complex array of successes 
and failures as a small, shifting group of people 
negotiated their self-understanding as a group first as 
liberators of information, cracking software (initially, 
Commodore 64 software) to make it freely available 
to people; then as appropriators of global 
commodities, hacking games to make them more 
culturally meaningful for local audiences; and finally, 
as creators, trying to make and release their own 
games while making a living out of it. 
 
The history of TEG is captured in various levels of 
detail in the group’s website – a frozen online archive 
apparently last updated in 2005. When fully printed 
out (as I had to do on account of the frequent 
blackouts in availability), the archive spans 236 
pages containing articles, game descriptions, member 
lists, event records, photographs, amongst other 
various things. The online archive also contains 
assorted related files such as disk images and 
playable files for some of their game projects. 
 
Their story unfolds across an extremely curious 
timeline – one that could be rightfully labelled as “a 
series of unfortunate events”. The group was active 
between 1989 and 2003, when it ultimately dissolved. 
This situates its inception during one of the toughest 
periods in recent Peruvian history: the later years of 
the first Garcia presidency were a social, political and 
economic disaster. In this environment, TEG was 
born as a Commodore 64 coding group, focused on 
making software available to the C64 community 
existing at the time in the city of Lima. While many 
other groups active at the same time were importing 
and selling C64 software for profit, sometimes going 
as far as stealing it from other groups or refusing to 
acknowledge due credit to crackers, TEG made no 
profit on the software they made available (although 
they would often charge depending on the amount of 
effort invested) and encouraged its distribution 
through then-nascent telephone Bulletin Board 
Systems (BBS) and self-organised “copy parties” 
where people could bring their own 5¼” disks and 
get their own pirated copies of software. 
 
The neoliberal reforms of the Fujimori regime would 
affect them in various ways. TEG members were 
very active in the early BBS community, hosting two 
of the most interesting boards in the early nineties. 
Users would dial into a BBS using their regular 
phone line and connect directly to another computer 
for some time, during which they could download 
information or leave messages in the board while the 
call lasted, all of which was relatively cheap because 
of the low rates charged by CPT, the State-owned 
telephone company. When CPT was privatized in the 
early 90s and sold to the Spanish telecommunications 
giant Telefónica, calling rates rose dramatically and 
essentially crippled the BBS community. 
Simultaneously, political pressure to strengthen 
property rights led to an overhaul of the nation’s 
intellectual property legislation in 1996, which was 
updated to contemplate newer media (such as 
software) and to facilitate enforcement by law 
agencies. 
 
The group was active through the entirety of the 
Fujimori regime and the democratic transition 
between the years 2000 and 2001, where they 
attempted to regain some traction after long periods 
of inactivity and instability by releasing a series of 
games fitting the political theme of those years. 
However, their attempt in 2002 to release the first 
locally developed and published game ended with 
them getting into a complicated legal dispute with 
their distributor over royalties generated by the game 
(which is, of course, extremely ironic considering the 
group’s origins), which at the time was being sold in 
physical CD-ROM format at retail establishments. In 
2003, after releasing a highly questionable 
pornographic knock-off of Tetris (under the name 
Samba de Oruga) with the hopes of fundraising the 
money they needed to support their legal dispute, the 
group ultimately folded under legal and financial 
pressures. 
 
The influence TEG had in the overall game 
development scene in Lima is very hard to map. 
Their production was certainly notable: according to 
their records, they released three games commercially 
(including the first Peruvian independent release, and 
the first Peruvian release in the European market), 
seven games as freeware, two game development 
code libraries and twenty-six hacked versions of 
console games. A significant share of this work was 
just happening through a process of reverse 
engineering: given the lack of formal training or 
available documentation, and of widespread access to 
information through the Internet, the only way for 
TEG members to understand how these technologies 
worked was through what would today seem like 
arcane methods. They would observe a piece of 
software functioning, and recreate pieces of code 
until they behaved exactly the same; or they would 
intervene in the normal operation of a program to 
observe what it was doing at the memory level, and 
inject operations and instructions at that very low 
level. The relative simplicity of computing platforms 
at the time played doubly to their favour: given the 
limited capacity of available technologies, the ceiling 
for what could be accomplished by smaller groups of 
programmers was within their reach; while at the 
same time, user expectations were considerably lower 
than what one would find today in the market. 
 
Their reverse engineering operations were not strictly 
limited to the technological. At a micro level, TEG 
was also negotiating their inclusion into global 
practices of software development and of gaming 
culture. The ideals of the Free Software Movement 
were being crafted through the 80s, and the open-
source operating system Linux would be first 
released in 1991, but the news about these 
developments had not reached the group when they 
were circumventing copy protection on software and 
openly distributing warez online – there is no 
mention of any of these in their records and, 
especially, in the issues of their early-90s discmag, 
Smiling Panda. But they were engaging with 
communities at the international level: their Amiga 
commercial release, GunBee F-99, was distributed 
and reviewed in Europe, and they have several 
records of communications with similar cracking 
groups in Europe, Mexico and Argentina. A 
significant part of their documents are available in 
both Spanish and English, and they actively 
maintained a dictionary file to help their developers 
acquaint themselves with technical terms in English. 
Moreover, their production can also be said to 
exemplify this reverse engineering of global 
practices: cracking a game to make it more locally 
meaningful was a similar practice taking place all 
over the continent as local communities creatively 
appropriated global cultural products, if only in 
small, self-contained ways. 
 
Yet the fact remains that not only did TEG disappear 
from the gaming scene in the early 2000s, but it also 
failed to leave behind any enduring or significant 
legacy. Even more so, they could sometimes become 
divisive presence and perhaps even a significant 
obstacle to the articulation of such a community. 
Their rhetoric and underlying ethos was often a 
divisive presence probably hindering the articulation 
of a broader community of interest, instead playing to 
an essential dichotomy between crackers and lamers, 
the latter being a category used loosely to describe 
people who couldn’t code, people who stole other’s 
code, people who uses helper toolkits and 
gamemakers, and then anyone that generally 
disagreed with them and their methods. Their 
collected archive of Peruvian video games explicitly 
states: “We take in count videogames that were 
developed by programming them (in assembler or C, 
mainly). Games made with authoring tools like Flash, 
game-makers and level map editors will be NOT 
INCLUDED in this list because those tools do not 
promote the Investigation, Programming and 
Optimization knowledgment” (sic). Given that 
Assembler and C are amongst the hardest ways to 
introduce people to programming, it is hardly 
surprising that a strong community would not come 
together around such demands, or that the group 
would find it increasingly hard to recruit members as 
it clung to fading technologies such as the C64 and 
Amiga as generic PCs and video game consoles, 
which they regarded as inferior machines, began to 
gain the larger market shares. 
 
There are two main reasons why I wanted to bring up 
the TEG case for discussion. The first one is that it 
provides an illustrative example of how an informal 
community of practice, operating from an economic, 
technological and cultural periphery, works to reverse 
engineer tools, processes and institutions to 
accomplish their objectives. Even lacking the access 
to the right infrastructure and systems that would 
enable them to produce their own video games – a 
lack that would’ve made most economic-centered 
endeavors unviable to begin with – they were still 
capable of finding the means, motives and 
opportunities to sustain an ongoing, continuously 
improving creative process, and to introduce into 
their locality a series of skills and knowledge that 
would otherwise remain unavailable. In this way, 
TEG was able to navigate what we saw earlier as one 
of the main challenges to increasing economic 
complexity in the context of developing economies: 
namely, the costs and complications associated to 
introducing new opportunities for effective skill 
acquisition. 
 
The second reason is that it also works as a great 
example for the methodological challenges stemming 
from researching this sort of community and the 
networks weaved around it. If we agree that there’s 
value in looking at the social practices taking place in 
these communities as a way to uncover networks of 
innovation operating informally outside the bounds 
of acknowledged economic activity, then we must 
also very closely consider the instruments and 
methods we’re deploying to discover, map and 
understand them. Looking at TEG as a historical case 
required paying attention to historical elements 
happening in multiple locations and contexts 
simultaneously, and the field of research cannot be 
said to have been at any one location at all times. In 
the next section, I want to go back to this 
methodological observation and consider specifically 
some of the challenges researchers can confront in 
trying to map informal networks of innovation. 
UNCOVERING NETWORKS: THREE 
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
The TEG case is an example of a research context 
where a traditional qualitative approach looking at 
social practices and connections within a community 
or a network, especially an ethnographic one, is 
challenged by the lack of a stable, clearly bounded 
and localized field site. There was not specific site 
for TEG, even if there may have been a base of 
operations at some point: events, connections, 
influences, technologies, they were all happening and 
moving through a series of pathways connecting 
them all together. Their connections to other 
localities around the world, and their participation in 
cultures and norms that were adopting a global shape 
(such as video game and software development) 
present specific challenges to the researcher 
attempting to draw an account of their activities. 
 
These challenges fall within a tradition, in the last 
few decades, of revising and questioning what the 
“object” and the “field” of research are in the case of 
qualitative research, and of ethnographic methods 
and instruments. As global and local relationships are 
renegotiated, so is the role and position of researchers 
towards the communities they’re working with. I 
want to pay a closer look at three specific such 
challenges: the upsetting of the relationship between 
the global and the local, the operational difficulties 
this poses in terms of accessing a field site, and the 
expanded sense of reciprocity this access demands on 
the researcher. 
Mapping the Global and the Local 
The notion of a multi-sited field of research is closely 
related to increasingly problematic notions of what it 
is to be “local” in the face of the emerging “global”. 
The need for a multi-sited field begins to emerge 
“from anthropology's participation in a number of 
interdisciplinary (in fact, ideologically 
antidisciplinary) arenas that have evolved since the 
1980s, such as media studies, feminist studies, 
science and technology studies, various strands of 
cultural studies, and the theory, culture, and society 
group.” (Marcus 1995, 97) These newly available 
sites demanded new strategies of interrogation and 
analysis. 
 
The shift to multi-sited fields upsets several of the 
conventions and assumptions – or “pre-theoretical 
commitments” in Henrietta Moore’s description 
(2004) – of traditional qualitative research. 
Consequently, as documented by Marcus, it also 
creates a series of anxieties spawning directly from 
the fact that scientific guarantees come into question. 
What came into question was whether these field 
sites should be the domain of other disciplines or 
methods more attuned to geographical and historical 
diversity and complexity. 
 
This does not automatically imply that the local is 
diluted out of existence, precisely because the global 
is both anywhere and nowhere at the same time. All 
experiences of the global are always through local 
instantiations. But the sense of what’s local is now 
posed the challenge of accounting for its connections 
to what’s happening in other places and landscapes. 
 
Ethnography becomes a practice of tracing these 
accounts through multiple layers of meaning and 
practice (very much what it has done traditionally), 
but with the caveat that this tracing is not bounded to 
a place that is local in the geographical sense. 
Participant observation then needs to become one of 
the tools at the researcher’s disposal in navigating 
these fields, but not the only one: researchers need to 
become acquainted with what Hugh Gusterson has 
termed “polymorphous engagement”: that is, 
“interacting with informants across a number of 
dispersed sites, not just in local communities, and 
sometimes in virtual form; and it means collecting 
data eclectically from a disparate array of sources in 
many different ways.” (Gusterson 1997, 39) 
Getting Access 
The unbinding of the field site under the terms 
examined above poses an operational challenge. No 
longer can sites of social research be considered to be 
ready for the taking by the skilful researcher, because 
any group or community at any location finds itself 
now under multiple influences from external 
elements that are not uniquely situated at any given 
location. The same processes that have unsettled the 
former bounds of the traditional field site have 
altered the political status of researchers and their 
communities under study. Access to a multi-sited 
field is not only operationally complicated, requiring 
innovative methodological approaches, but is also 
culturally challenging and layered, and ceases to be 
about where the site is located or where the 
researcher is coming from. But even once access is 
gained, that doesn’t necessarily imply one will get 
meaningful information to “follow” the practices of a 
community. 
 
Yuri Takhteyev’s ethnographic work with software 
developers in Rio de Janeiro (Takhteyev 2012) 
provides a good illustration. In his fieldwork in 
various software development projects, Takhteyev 
found that in order to understand the practices of 
developers working in Rio de Janeiro, it was 
necessary to look at how “worlds of practice” were 
constituted across locales. Not only technical 
knowledge, but also business practices, social norms 
and values and personal aspirations were circulated 
across these networks. This information only became 
available after taking an active stance as a 
collaborator in the software development projects he 
was observing. This shift yielded the realization of 
everything he was missing through traditional 
participant observation (or in any case, all those 
dimensions in which he was not participating): the 
codebase, the issue logs, the e-mail threads, the 
documentation, and so on. Even after gaining access 
to these locations, his position and commitment 
continued to be challenged by his informants 
(Takhteyev 2012, 16). 
 
The people in these multi-sited fields are now in a 
position to have much clearer understanding of the 
role they play in global information flows (or 
“landscapes”), and consequently to impose much 
stricter demands on researchers trying to gain access 
to their networks – especially when those networks 
are directly connected to their livelihood. 
Reciprocating 
These instances of going beyond the traditional role 
of researcher could be understood as variations on the 
theme of participant observation: in a multi-sited 
field, the spectrum of activities one must participate 
in simply becomes more diverse. But again, there are 
epistemological and methodological issues at stake 
here. We can either hold on to positivistic 
expectations of ethnographic work, or we can 
alternatively acknowledge an expanded role of 
researchers not just as documenting but also 
contributing to define the field itself through their 
actions. While the decision of one over the other 
remains ultimately with the researcher, it is important 
for us to acknowledge the claims that underlie each 
position and the trade-offs we’re incurring in when 
negotiating these boundaries. 
 
Takhteyev’s fieldwork experience, mentioned above, 
provides one illustration of such expanded sense of 
reciprocity. In dealing with members of the 
community he was researching, he was only able to 
gain further access to invisible locations by becoming 
an active contributor to the codebase. The burden in 
this case is significant, as his time on the field was 
now split between his commitments to his research 
project, and those to the development tasks he was 
volunteering to complete. At the same time, this 
possibility was only afforded to him because he 
already had knowledge of programming and software 
development practices, even if he was not fully fluent 
in them. We can legitimately ask whether this is the 
case for all researchers in all situations, or whether a 
researcher’s interest and capacity to access a field 
now becomes mediated through professional 
competencies, subject-matter expertise or technical 
proficiency. Where traditional research sites were 
found to be valuable because of their otherness, 
multi-sited fields would appear in this sense to 
discriminate based on proximity rather than 
remoteness. 
 
A different involvement with production processes 
can be found in Ian Condry’s work with anime 
producers in Japan. In his case, late in his fieldwork, 
he became unexpectedly drafted to contribute to a 
part of the production process by doing some voice 
work for an anime movie he was following (Condry 
2013, 144). It can hardly be said that had he not taken 
part of this production stage, the ultimate result 
would not have been accomplished. But these are 
instances in which researchers were forced by 
circumstances in the field to very explicitly take a 
stand around specific issues, practices or groups. The 
issue of positioning acquires greater importance 
when we’re considering multi-sited fields because the 
researcher might be interacting not only with groups 
that are internally inconsistent, but also with multiple 
parties spread across a field whose actions might be 
directly in conflict or contradiction. The question 
over “whose side you’re on” becomes more 
complicated the more sides are available to choose 
from. 
 
Some contexts and political positions will lend 
themselves to more complicated evaluations of the 
allegiances of the researcher. If researchers are going 
to be expected to assume one position or another 
when dealing with the various locations in a field, 
anticipating this expectation and having solid 
arguments as to why one stands for or against 
something, and how far one is willing to go for such 
position, become useful rules of thumb. While 
occasional roles in production might seem relatively 
uncontroversial, larger roles in leadership or 
organisation might be more troubling – even more so 
in the case of advocacy or championing roles. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the early 1990s, Michael Porter presented a 
reading of innovation that sought to shift the 
explanations of technology change from the 
macroeconomic view to the microeconomic decisions 
and relations being established by firms in the 
market. In his view, available explanations were 
incapable of addressing “why and how meaningful 
and commercially valuable skills and technology are 
created” (Porter 1998, 9). This in turn led him to 
present an account of how firms benefitted from 
collaborating in clusters, as knowledge spillovers 
from individual firms were beneficial to the cluster as 
a whole, and became further incentives to skill 
development and technological improvement as a 
more or less organic process. 
 
But such cluster building efforts involve large-scale, 
long-term commitments which themselves require 
baseline institutional frameworks and infrastructure 
availability which are many times unavailable in the 
context of developing economies. At the same time, 
failure to introduce such new skills and capabilities 
for technical change only increases the gap with more 
complex economies, and the difficulties of 
overcoming latecomer disadvantages when entering 
higher complexity markets. The work of Hausmann 
and Hidalgo also shows that commitment to a limited 
number of productive clusters, regardless of their 
complexity and added value, is not a good 
mechanism to provide resilience in the face of 
changing economic conditions, as smaller footprints 
within the product space imply fewer opportunities 
for repurposing skills and capabilities if an economy 
should find itself in the need to do so. 
 
I’ve attempted to present an interpretation of informal 
communities of practice, as illustrated by the TEG 
case, as providing spaces for creative prototyping 
driven by self-motivation and social relations rather 
than by economic interest and expectation of 
financial payoffs. Networks of innovation operating 
in this fashion are flying under the radar of 
conventional metrics precisely because of this, yet 
within their activities they’re coming up with creative 
ways to reverse engineer global processes and 
practices and adapt them creatively to the needs of 
local practitioners and audiences. These creative 
networks are out there and are failing to be 
considered when it comes to policy initiatives, long-
term investment strategies, and even research 
projects. 
 
At the same time, I’ve also attempted to express how 
these networks pose specific research challenges if 
we’re interested in uncovering and understanding 
them. Because of their nature, their practices and 
potential require different approaches – for example, 
mapping their operations through various forms of 
qualitative research rather than through analysis of 
economic indicators – and these approaches 
themselves face methodological challenges from 
having to deal with multi-sited fields of research 
where activities are scattered through multiple 
localities, drawing together networks of both human 
and non-human actors (Latour 2005). 
 
While these networks are actively introducing new 
skills into societies and economies, they often remain 
economically invisible and implausible. A qualitative 
approach focused on the social practices of these 
communities can help uncover their potential value 
and point towards opportunities for unblocking and 
developing that potential value. For many developing 
economies, unlocking the value in otherwise 
underestimated creative industries can provide hugely 
valuable pathways towards achieving much needed 
economic diversity and complexity. 
Paying attention to these networks can provide fertile 
grounds on which to find forms of peripheral and 
grassroots innovation, as they figure out ways to 
circumvent the various obstacles and absences that 
would otherwise stop them from being effective. 
Their very existence highlights system deficiencies 
blocking full development of creative value. Some 
networks will thrive and some will wither, but out of 
their experiments new generations of makers and 
creators are emerging to break the ground on new 
forms of production in entirely unexpected places. 
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